Twittersphere's reaction to the topics covered by President Obama (see http://twitter.github. io/interactive/sotu2015). This is just one of many examples of the blending of social media and politics. Some use this and other cases to support the argument that social media can empower citizens, boost democracy, and help gauge the pulse of public opinion. However, there are also worrisome counterexamples of social media being used as a tool for repression. 2 In fact, the confluence of social media with political action is a complex field raising important questions. Is social media a realm for democratic deliberation? Can we ascertain public opinion from social media outlets? How are people using social media for political participation? Can social media boost democracy in authoritarian regimes? Here, I consider these questions and contemplate the future of social media and politics.
Democratic Deliberation
Deliberation is crucial in modern democracy. However, although "dialogue is preferable to violence, and good dialogue is preferable to poor dialogue,"
3 not every conversation qualifies for democratic deliberation. Proper democratic deliberation assumes that citizens are equal participants, that opposing viewpoints are not only accepted but encouraged, and that the main goal is to achieve "rationally motivated consensus." 3 Unfortunately, there are strong arguments against social media discussions being deliberations of this kind.
To start with, not all social media users are equal; indeed, political, corporate, and media elites have colonized social media. 4, 5 Such elites are central actors in political social networks, interacting mostly with each other and rarely with non-elite users 4 (that is, common citizens who aren't politicians, corporate executives, high-ranking journalists, and so on). Furthermore, posts by social media elites usually have a clear agenda-building objective, and such posts are favored by the general public over posts from non-elite users.
5
Regarding ideological diversity, social media users are not isolated in echo chambers. However, although they have a certain degree of exposure to cross-cutting ideas (even to users who are clearly partisans) and can interact with users who have opposing ideas, most social media users prefer to avoid such discussions. 6 When they do encounter conflicting arguments, they do not propagate them within their network. Moreover, homophily-the tendency to favor interaction with like-minded people-is a strong force throughout online social networks. 6 Finally, when political discussions do occur, they aren't always rational and democratic deliberations for the following reasons:
Political information in social media generally lacks strong arguments and coherency and is highly opinionated.
seemed to be central points during the first US presidential debate in 2012.
Live-tweeted debates, such as #SOTU, are increasingly common and appear to be guided discussions, indirectly driven by the agenda set by the media and political actors. Elite users often try to rebut the criticisms of non-elite users through "official accounts" provided by the political parties or candidates.
Finally, social media is best suited for "blinkered deliberation," 9 where users are not talking to each other but posting messages for others to read. That is not "public deliberation but deliberation in public." 9 Because of these issues, social media fails to fulfill the criteria that Douglas Kellner suggested for cyberspace being a public sphere:
Computer technologies [should] be used to serve the interests of the people and not corporate elites [. . .] to inform and enlighten individuals rather than to manipulate them [. . .] to articulate their own experiences and interests, and to promote democratic debate and diversity, allowing a full range of voices and ideas to become part of the cyberdemocracy of the future. 10 From this viewpoint, social media doesn't appear to be a realm for democratic deliberation. Rather, social media is the product of communicative capitalism, 11 and the goal is not to boost political action but to commoditize and monetize individual communication. Certainly, social media operators care about the interests of their users-and their right to free speech-but only to the extent that such interests do not affect their investors or the laws under which they operate. Facebook, for example, can claim "Je suis Charlie" in the US one day and ban pages in Turkey on the grounds of blasphemy another day. 12 
Public Opinion
It is important to distinguish between the following: public opinion as the collective outcome of rational deliberation on issues of common interest (such deliberation being a discussion process in which all participants have the same chance to make their voices heard and in which reasoned arguments are used to support each position), and public opinion as the aggregated results of surveys administered to a sample of a given population.
As discussed, the former does not currently exist in social media; however, social media brim with opinionated messages distilled into the second variety of public opinion. Unfortunately, that sort of public opinion suffers from some weaknesses.
First of all, this type of public opinion views every social message as equally valid, no matter its provenance (elite or non-elite user, spammer, automated account, and so on) and without questioning whether the content is misleading or even manipulative (astroturfing and smearing posts).
Second, it processes only observable data, so it doesn't account for nonresponses. When studying public opinion in social media, we are actually observing the opinion of a vocal minority. 13 This, combined with the "spiral of silence" effect, 14 should be a major concern when mining opinions from social media. Third, social media users are not monolithic; even purportedly homogenous ideological groups react differently to different topics. Social media opinion departs from public opinion, and it does it differently depending on the topic: sometimes the social media opinion is liberal; other times, it is conservative.
Furthermore, social media users are not a random sample from the population: men, youth, and urban dwellers are overrepresented. 15 Given that such features are important with regard to political choices, the nonrandomness of social media is another problem.
In spite of these weaknesses, there are plenty of efforts to gauge public opinion from social Social media is the product of communicative capitalism, and the goal is not to boost political action.
April-June 2015 media, and I present the three main approaches here. 16 However, each approach presents various challenges, which is why more traditional public opinion surveys are still alive and kicking.
The Vox Pop Approach
The first one is the "vox pop" approach, or "voice of the people." 16 This approach consists of using an assorted selection of tweets to illustrate views on some issue. It is not uncommon in journalism, where it's used to support an argument, but it should not qualify as public opinion.
Aggregated Metrics
The quantitative approach consists of aggregating social media metrics for a given topic, usually defined on the basis of users' profiles, keywords, or hashtags. For example, a candidate might report on the number of followers or friends he or she has, or on the growing number of tweets regarding a certain topic. This approach has been refined in two different ways. In one way, researchers use social media data to produce a time series that aims to represent the public's mood. With enough data, it is possible to determine if a given peak in mood is abnormal and, in that case, mine social media contents to obtain keywords related to that unexpected peak. One major problem with this approach is that it only employs social media data, so results can be inconsistent. The height of the peaks does not always correspond to the actual reaction of the public: sometimes social media seem to overreact; other times, it underreacts.
The second refinement of the quantitative approach addresses this issue by correlating the time series obtained from social media with others obtained from traditional public opinion polls. Some have used this to "nowcast" consumer confidence or presidential job approval, 17 or to forecast elections using pre-electoral polls for the "training" phase.
Semantic Polling
Finally, we have semantic polling-that is, "mining and natural language reading of textual data such as Tweets to draw conclusions about public opinion." 16 This would be the
closest approach to open-ended surveys and, given the available background in topic detection and tracking methods, it could be an interesting line of research. However, because of social media biases toward fast-pace and techrelated topics, 4 we risk viewing "trending topics" as public opinion. Moreover, although methods based on a time series could "discount," to a certain extent, misinformation and disinformation, semantic polling would fall prey to such misleading data and could suffer from sample biases.
Political Participation
Expressing your political views and discussing them with others are common ways of participating in politics, and both are also common in social media, but they do not contribute to a highly reflective discourse.
18
Self-expression and group discussion-along with voting, mobilizing others, contacting elected officials, volunteering in a campaign, or running for office-are forms of conventional political participation. Public demonstrations, rioting, refusing to obey unjust laws, uprisings, and revolutions are examples of unconventional or contentious political action. Both forms of participation have been observed in social media.
Regarding conventional participation, note that at the beginning of Web 2.0, some argued that it could boost political engagement of the population at large-and of the youth and other uninvolved groups in particular. 19 Unfortunately, social media users are not more politically engaged than nonusers, and those who are politically active are no better informed because of using social media (sometimes, quite the opposite can be true). 7 Moreover, politically inclined social media users are similar in terms of gender, income, and education to politically active citizens who don't use social media. 18 Age is the only real difference Social media users are not more politically engaged than nonusers, and those who are politically active are no better informed because of using social media.
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Multimedia Impact between both groups, but younger people who are politically engaged in social media tend to indulge in slacktivism (online actions performed in support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring little time or involvement, such as signing an online petition). 20 Political campaigning, however, is an area in which social media has been extensively used. 21 For example, campaign managers use social media to announce that their candidate is running for election, make the candidate look more authentic and accessible, organize campaign staff, recruit supporters and volunteers, obtain funds, mobilize voters, and spread the candidate's message. It is interesting that, although politicians have praised the possibilities that social media offers for deliberation with citizens, they tend to use social media as a one-way communication tool, rarely engaging in discussion with other users. 22 After being elected, they also fail to engage with their constituency, using social media to keep constituents informed but not to discuss their policies. 23 Indeed, it seems social media is used as a permanent campaign tool to keep politicians on the users' radar. Many credited Obama's successful presidential campaign in 2008 to social media usage; however, the truth is that the outcome strongly depends on the candidates, their message, their staff, and their ability to mobilize a large enough part of the electorate. 21 
Improving the Prospects
The promises of social media to boost political engagement and democracy are still unfulfilled. (For more information, see the "Is Social Media a Democratization Force?" sidebar.) This is not surprising, because social media is a privately operated mass consumption product, aimed at entertaining an audience, not at allowing them to engage in political actions. Indeed, social media might help individualistic participation in contentious political actions, but it fails to help users articulate concrete and full-fledged political proposals.
To improve the prospects of political action in social media, we must pursue the following lines of research:
Foster the development of distributed and federated social media systems, similar to those used by GNU social (https://gnu.io/ social). Without centralized commercial silos, authoritarian regimes would likely have more trouble building support to ban content, block users, or gather personal data about opposing individuals.
Develop new user interfaces to improve reflective deliberation instead of the currently pervasive blinkered deliberation. Experience with sites such as E-Democracy (http://e-democracy.org) could be invaluable in achieving this.
Continue work on information provenance in social media; credibility assessment; 24 and the detection of astroturfing, smear campaigns, and socialbot networks.
Go beyond nowcasting public opinion polls using social media data and develop new methods to infer the latent issues that constitute the public agenda.
In other words, we need to develop technologies that, instead of monetizing communication, serve the people by letting them freely express themselves, access trustworthy information, engage in meaningful deliberation, and organize themselves without fear of being commoditized, manipulated, monitored, or harassed by authorities. Citizens willing to engage in politics, especially those in authoritarian regimes, deserve better, and as a community, we can do better. Is Social Media a Democratization Force?
The same silver-bullet quality attributed to social media when discussing political engagement or electoral campaigns has been invoked when discussing "social media revolutions." From Moldova to Hong Kong, passing through Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Spain, Wall Street, and Ukraine, protests, uprisings, and revolutions have been labeled as social media revolts.
Social Media Movements: The Impact (Or Lack Thereof)
Undeniably, social media and the Internet have reduced the need for formal organizations in collective actions, and this has produced the impression that current social movements are horizontal and leaderless. However, not every digitally networked action corresponds to such a description and, moreover, such actions should not be described merely by the tools they use.
To start with, some of such movements are collective actions using social media, while others are connective actions.
1 The difference between them is important: in the first case, a collective identity arises, while in the second case, it is not needed. Consequently, connective actions are individualized-in the sense of "networked individualism" 2 -because participants do not see themselves as members of a group but as individuals that at a given time connect to other individuals to pursue some concrete objective.
Because of this, connective actions risk becoming chaotic and unproductive, and some argue that the individualistic participation promoted by social media is not empowering but rather a threat for social movements that undermine the public sphere in the long run. 3 Regarding the outcomes of digitally networked actions, anecdotal evidence is not encouraging. Consider the protests in Moldova. In April 2009, protesters claimed that Moldovan parliamentary elections were fraudulent (despite statements on the contrary from The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). They organized themselves using Twitter and demanded a recount, new elections, or the government's resignation. Protests ended up in riots, but none of the demands were met. The parliament resulting of the elections did not succeed to elect a president, and early elections were held in July 2009.
You can also consider the 2009 Iranian presidential election. After the election, a number of protests took place across Iran claiming the result was fraudulent. The protests were quite visible in Twitter, particularly for the international community, and they gathered strong support (and media coverage) outside Iran. Despite glossy portrayals of the power of Twitter in this uprising, the truth is that Twitter penetration in Iran was negligible, and most of the tweets were support messages from international users. 4 Furthermore, in 2014, Hong Kong witnessed massive pacific demonstrations against proposed reforms to Hong Kong's electoral system. Note that there was no popular consensus on these protests, and some of the population strongly contested the protestors. Social media played a role in these events as in prior ones, but there were little claims that they played a major one; instead, Internet censorship was quite strong and the protestors failed to achieve their goals.
The Egypt revolution brought a regime change, but the new government was also contested by the population and eventually overthrown in a coup d' etat. Similarly, Euromaidan brought a government change, but it was accompanied by war in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The antiausterity movement in Spain, 15-M, eventually faded out, although from its aftermath came a new political party (Podemos) challenging the status quo. Finally, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US, fighting against economic inequality, also faded out. Only the Tunisian Revolution can be considered a partial success, given that the country is slowly consolidating a democracy.
In spite of such outcomes, or because of the hopeful Tunisian result, the question of social media's democratic catalyzing power in oppressive regimes is unavoidable. In this regard, there are conflicting opinions.
Social Media as a Catalyst
Cyberoptimistic scholars claim that social media was crucial for the Arab Spring uprisings and that, although not causing them, they greatly facilitated and accelerated the revolutions. 5 Others limit the role of social media to a tactical advantage for coordination purposes, and a few argue that mass media (particularly satellite television) legitimized the social media activists and actually drove the events. 6 Nevertheless, the consensus among most authors toning down the role of social media in the Arab Spring is that there existed prior causes for the revolts-such as inequality, unemployment, or poverty-and that democratic debate predated social media use in those countries and was being held in other spaces. Certainly, some support has been provided to consider both Internet and mobile phone use as key causes in the revolts, but always combined with other variables and with different importance, depending on the country. Indeed, when comparing the outcomes of different social media revolts, it seems clear that their success or failure had little to do with social media usage and more to do with each country's context.
In fact, in countries exerting a tight control over the Internet, social media use can backfire on activists-as was the case in Iran or Syria 4,7 -or it can be exploited as a "safe valve" by the regime. A prime example of the latter is censorship under China's "networked authoritarianism." Chinese social media users are relatively free to criticize the state, its leaders, and their policies without fearing censorship; what is quickly censored is any message (even positive) calling for a collective action.
